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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Fred Frey and Robert Demas ("defendants") appeal their 
sentences after convictions by a jury on four counts of wire 
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and two counts of mail fraud under 
18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
 The fraud arose from a scheme by defendants to purport 
to buy a non-existent boat.  Defendants borrowed money to pay for 
the boat, they insured it and then they reported it missing.  
They planned to repay the loan with the insurance proceeds and  
intended to profit by retaining the loan money.  Thus, they had 
proposed to make the insurance company the ultimate victim.  The 
scheme was discovered and defendants were found guilty and 
sentenced.  This appeal followed. 
 A. Defendants' Motion for Acquittal  
  The defendants first contend that because of the 
insufficiency of the government's proof the district court erred 
in denying their Rule 29 motion for acquittal on Counts 2, 4, 5, 
and 7.  These counts were based on telephone calls and mailings 
between Anne Scarlata ("Scarlata") of Admiralty Documentation 
Services and the defendants.  
 The elements required to support a conviction under the 
mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, are: 1) a scheme to 
  
defraud;1 and 2) the use of the mails for the purpose of 
executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341 (1988 & Supp. III 1993); United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 
535, 544 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, (No. 94-5771), 1994 WL 466503 
(Nov. 7, 1994); United States v. Ruuska, 883 F.2d 263, 264 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, is 
identical to the mail fraud statute except it speaks of 
communications transmitted by wire. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988 & 
Supp. III 1993); United States v. Zauber, 857 F.2d 137, 142 (3d 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989).2 
 As defendants correctly point out, not every use of the 
mails or wires in connection with a scheme is punishable under 
sections 1341 or 1343.  This court has held, "To support a mail 
fraud conviction, a mailing must further the scheme to defraud or 
be incident to an essential part of that scheme." Ruuska, 883 
F.2d at 264; see United States v. Otto, 742 F.2d 104, 108 (3d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985). 
 In financing the boat, General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation ("GMAC") had to secure a federal lien on the boat.  
In order to secure the federal lien, GMAC contacted Admiralty 
Documentation Services, operated by Scarlata, to perform a title 
                     
1
.  Defendants admitted that they have engaged in a scheme to 
defraud. See, e.g., Brief of Defendants at 7-8, United States v. 
Frey and Demas (Nos. 94-1594 & 94-1605) (hereinafter "Defendants' 
Br."); Appendix at 195A-96A, 398A, 403A. 
2
.  This court stated, "[T]he cases construing the mail fraud 
statute are applicable to the wire fraud statute as well." United 
States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1977); see United 
States v. Bentz, 21 F.3d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1994). 
  
search.  In her efforts to properly search the boat's title, 
Scarlata exchanged numerous telephone calls and letters with 
defendants.  These exchanges provided the mailings and wirings 
requirements in four counts of the indictment.  
 Defendants argue that the exchanges with Scarlata were 
not made in furtherance of the scheme to defraud because they 1) 
were made after the scheme had come to fruition; and 2) served to 
frustrate, not further, the scheme. 
 Defendants' argument that their scheme had come to 
fruition when the loan was granted misconstrues the nature of the 
indictment, which charged an overall scheme to defraud GMAC, 
General Sales, Hampton Roads Documentation Services, Admiralty 
Documentation Services, Guba and Associates, Hull and Company, 
and Lloyds of London. See Appendix at 503A (the federal 
indictment); see also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 452 
(1986).  In fact, defendants have agreed with the government's 
characterization of the scheme, see Defendants' Br. at 7-8, and 
have stated that the Scarlata communications occurred during the 
scheme. See id. at 17.  The government charged one scheme, not a 
series of schemes.  At the time of the Scarlata communications, 
the boat was not yet reported stolen or missing.  Based on the 
evidence presented, we conclude that a reasonable jury could  
find that the scheme to defraud had not been concluded before the 
Scarlata communications took place. 
 Defendants next argue that their communications with 
Scarlata were routine business mailings and calls that 
  
contributed to the eventual unravelling of the scheme and cannot 
support a mail or wire fraud conviction.  
 This court has held that "the mere classification of a 
letter as a `routine business mailing' is [not] a defense to mail 
fraud." United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 668 (3d Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).  The mailing, or wiring, could 
support a mail or wire fraud conviction "if the mailing is part 
of executing the fraud, or closely related to the scheme . . . 
even though the mailing was also related to a valid business 
purpose." Id.  As the United States Supreme Court has stated, 
"[M]ailings [and wirings] which facilitate concealment of the 
scheme are covered by the statute." Lane, 474 U.S. at 453 
(internal quotations omitted) (footnote omitted).  Defendants' 
evaluation of the evidence lacks merit. 
 Defendants assert that the communications were not 
"closely related to the scheme" because they tended to "unravel" 
rather than further the scheme and thus were not probative of the 
scheme.  Generally, mailings or wirings that serve to put the 
defrauded party on notice, or make the execution of the fraud 
less likely, cannot support a conviction under the mail or wire 
fraud statutes. See Otto, 742 F.2d at 109; Tarnopol, 561 F.2d at 
473.  The cases cited by defendants in support of their argument 
that the Scarlata communications were not closely related to the 
scheme, however, involved situations where the only effect of the 
communications was to frustrate the scheme. See, e.g., United 
States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974); United States v. Kann, 323 
  
U.S. 88 (1944).  In this case, the communications were incident 
to an essential part of defendants' scheme to defraud.   
 Furthermore, defendants needed the Scarlata 
communications either to conceal the fraud or further their 
scheme. See Appendix at 245A, 248A (Scarlata testimony regarding 
defendants' cooperation).  The evidence established that the 
Scarlata communications were made in the course of securing a 
federal lien.  It is both common for a finance company to secure 
a federal lien on a loan of this size and to have the boat 
documented. See Appendix at 200A; see also id. at 200A-02A, 234A, 
240A, 258A.  In addition, a letter from GMAC to Scarlata was 
introduced which listed Frey as a customer "required to have 
Marine Documentation."  Government's Appendix at 11a.  In fact, 
the documentation in this case was required by law. See id. at 
213A, 258A. 
 At trial, Mr. Hamilton of GMAC testified that if GMAC 
were unable to perfect a lien or verify title on the Frey/Demas 
boat, then General Sales, the company defendants contacted to 
arrange the financing through GMAC, would be asked to pay off the 
boat loan. Id. at 260A.  Here, the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that defendants communicated with Scarlata in order to 
either further their scheme or to facilitate the concealment of 
the scheme.  If the fraud had been uncovered, defendants' scheme 
could have come to an abrupt halt. See Schmuck v. United States, 
489 U.S. 705, 712 (1988).  These communications were at least 
incidental to the scheme. 
  
 Although the communications with Scarlata may have 
hastened the uncovering of the fraud, this factor does not 
necessarily preclude the conclusion that these communications 
support the mail or wire fraud convictions.  In Schmuck, the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
 We . . . reject . . . [the] contention that 
mailings that someday may contribute to the 
uncovering of a fraudulent scheme cannot 
supply the mailing element of the mail fraud 
offense.  The relevant question at all times 
is whether the mailing is part of the 
execution of the scheme as conceived by the 
perpetrator at the time, regardless of 
whether the mailing later, through hindsight, 
may prove to have been counterproductive and 
return to haunt the perpetrator of the fraud.   
Id. at 715.   
 Defendants argue that unlike the scheme in Schmuck, the 
present scheme did not involve "an ongoing fraudulent venture."  
Defendants' Reply Brief at 3, United States v. Frey and Demas 
(Nos. 94-1594 & 94-1605).  In the present case, as in Schmuck, to 
successfully complete the fraudulent scheme, defendants had to 
maintain the illusion of the existence of the fictitious boat (at 
least until the insurance proceeds were paid).  At the time of 
the communications, the mailings and wirings were not routine, 
post-fraud, or merely coincidental to the scheme, they were a 
part of the execution of the scheme.  We do not find defendants' 
argument persuasive here. 
 Defendants next assert that the district court erred in 
not granting their motion for acquittal on Counts 1 and 6 of the 
indictment because the United States did not prove that the 
  
communications supporting those counts were made for the purpose 
of executing the scheme.  
 On July 11, 1989, Frey was contacted with an insurance 
quote on the boat.  Defendants contend that this communication 
could not be "in furtherance of the scheme" because Frey provided 
Guba with the incorrect Hull Identification Number (HIN).  As Ms. 
Stanley, from Guba and Associates, testified, a HIN is not even 
required to provide an insurance quote. See Appendix at 113A.  
The boat had many other distinguishing features, see, e.g., id. 
at 93A, and the number would eventually be used for 
identification.  However, the evidence at trial could reasonably 
support the conclusion that Guba and defendants were discussing 
the same boat.  The GMAC finance application required defendants 
to maintain insurance on the boat. See Government's Appendix at 
9a; Appendix at 401A; 477A.  We conclude that a reasonable trier 
of fact could find that the July 11, 1989 call was a step in 
defendants' scheme to defraud by securing insurance as required 
under the finance contract and to repay the loan. 
 Also, defendants argue that the January 18, 1990 call 
to Guba and Associates could not be "in furtherance of the 
scheme" because they had failed to comply with a warranty in the 
insurance contract, which required defendants to store the boat 
in an enclosed facility.  Thus, defendants argue that "[t]he 
scheme had no chance from the outset because there was no 
coverage for the selected fictional location." Defendants' Br. at 
18.   
  
 It is apparent that defendants' argument goes to the 
ultimate success of the fraud.  This court has stated that the 
success of the scheme is not relevant in a mail or wire fraud 
conviction; it is sufficient that the defendant had the intent to 
defraud. See Zauber, 857 F.2d at 142; see also Copple, 24 F.3d at 
544-45.  In the present case, defendants' failure to comply with 
the contract warranty may have resulted in a denial of coverage.  
But, what is relevant is defendants' intent to defraud.  By 
convicting defendants, the jury implicitly concluded that 
defendants possessed the requisite intent to defraud.  On January 
18, 1990, the scheme was still alive, and a reasonable juror 
could have found that the report to the insurance company was a 
planned step in the scheme.  As defendants admitted, they had to 
collect the insurance proceeds so as not to have to personally 
repay the loan. 
 Defendants also argue that GMAC was not at risk of loss 
because the loan was a full recourse loan, with General Sales 
guaranteeing the GMAC loan, and because the GMAC loan was to be 
satisfied with the loan proceeds.  See Defendants' Br. at 17.  
The government charged that the insurance company, not GMAC, 
would suffer a loss of money.  A reasonable trier of fact could 
have concluded that the calls to and from Guba and Associates 
were in furtherance of defendants' scheme to ultimately cause the 
insurance company monetary loss. 
 We conclude that the district court did not err in 
denying defendants' motion for acquittal. 
  
  B. Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction 
 Defendants argue that the district court erred in 
refusing to give proposed Jury Instructions numbers 10, 11, 12, 
and 16, which allegedly stated defendants' theories of defense. 
 As the Supreme Court stated, "[A] defendant is entitled 
to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there 
exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his 
favor." Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); see 
United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 539 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 Proposed Jury Instruction 11 focused on defendants' 
allegation that GMAC would not suffer any loss.  As explained 
above, the government did not charge that GMAC was the ultimate 
victim. See Appendix at 503A.  Therefore, defendants' claim that 
GMAC was not at a risk of loss would not provide a defense to the 
charges. 
 Defendants' proposed Jury Instructions 10 and 12 
focused on defendants' allegation that the insurance policy would 
not provide coverage for the claimed loss.  Defendants requested 
that the jury be instructed that the government had the burden of 
proving that the policy would in fact cover their loss.  
 Defendants' asked the district court, and now this 
court, to effectively add an element to the mail and wire fraud 
statutes.  As explained, these arguments go to the success of the 
scheme, which is not an element of the statutes. See Copple, 24 
F.3d at 544-45; Zauber, 857 F.2d at 142.  The indictment did not 
charge the ultimate success of the plot, but rather the scheme to 
defraud.  As explained above, the communications relating to 
  
proposed instructions 10 and 12 were essential steps in the plot.  
Therefore, neither proposed instruction 10 nor 12 would provide a 
recognized defense to defendants' convictions. 
 Finally, defendants' proposed Jury Instruction 16 
referred specifically to the different HINs.  Defendants asked 
the district court to instruct the jury that the government had 
the burden of proving that the telephone call alleged in Count 1 
of the federal indictment was in furtherance of the scheme to 
obtain coverage on HIN WELP 5148H889.  As explained at trial, the 
HIN was not important to the July 11, 1989 phone call.  The call 
was an essential part of defendants' efforts to obtain insurance 
proceeds to pay the fraudulently obtained loan.  The government 
was only required to prove that the call was in furtherance of 
their scheme to defraud.  Again, the ultimate success of the 
scheme is irrelevant. 
 As this court explained, even if the evidence supports 
defendants' theories of defense, the court will examine the 
district court's instructions as a whole to determine whether 
they adequately presented these theories of defense to the jury. 
See Paolello, 951 F.2d at 539.  In this case, the district court 
charged the jury that the government had the burden of proving 
that all the communications were made in furtherance of the 
charged scheme. See Appendix at 438A.  The trial testimony and 
exhibits advised the jury of the facts surrounding Counts 1 and 
6.  Even if defendants were correct as to the existence of their 
theories of defense, the court's charge adequately addressed 
them.  
  
 The district court committed no error by declining to 
give these requested instructions. 
 The judgments of the district court will be affirmed. 
 __________________________ 
 
